In this paper, I assess recent claims in philosophy of science about scientific perspectivism being compatible with realism. I clarify the rationale for perspectival realism and the challenges it faces in striking a middle ground in between realism and epistemic pluralism. I focus on how knowledge claims can be regarded as true across different scientific perspectives, and I propose a new way of thinking about truth across scientific perspectives that in my view can deliver on the promise of realism while also being sensitive to epistemic pluralism.
Michela Massimi is professor of philosophy at University of Edinburgh. In July 2012 she founded and is currently leading the Research Cluster in Philosophy of Science. Before joining Edinburgh, Michela taught for seven years at UCL in the Dept. of Science and Technology Studies, and in 2009 she was Visiting Professor at HPS, Pittsburgh. She completed her PhD at the LSE in 2002, and in 2002-2005 she was Junior Research Fellow at Girton College, University of Cambridge.