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Agency, Trying, and Final Causes

Agency, Trying and Final Causes with Ferenc Huoranszki
Thursday, December 3, 2020, 4:30 pm – 6:00 pm

For Huoranszki intentionality of behavior is an irreducibly teleological phenomenon, and hence we cannot dismiss the idea of final causation in our account of intentional action. Intentional actions have, of course, efficient causes, and in certain contexts those causes can even explain what an agent does. But efficient causes cannot explain why what the agent does is intentional as the still dominant causal theories of actions aim to do.

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The chief goal of the "Meant to Be: Resuscitating the Metaphysics of Teleology" project is to foster intelligent debate on philosophical issues concerning science, religion, and their conflicts and connections. To find out more about this project, please visit its website: