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Abstract | This paper is about what we do when we give moral advice. Philosophical literature on moral testimony focuses on cases in which cases are trying to decide which action to pursue from a given set of options. But in our moral lives, we frequently turn to others for guidance because we need help making sense of a moral situation that leaves us confused or shaken. We are trying to figure out how to think and feel about an experience, not which action is most supported by our reasons. What is it to make sense of a moral situation? I propose an account and draw out consequences for moral epistemology as well as the ethics of giving advice.
Bio | Paulina Sliwa is professor of Moral and Political Philosophy at the University of Vienna, Austria. She studied at the University of Oxford (BA) and received her Ph.D. from MIT in 2012. Prof. Sliwa was a senior lecturer at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Sidney Sussex College before moving to the University of Vienna in 2021. In her philosophical research she has contributed to a wide range of topics in ethics and moral epistemology, focussing in particular on normative concepts such as responsibility, testimony, and excuse, and on the nature and ethics of labour and labour division. She is currently working towards a monograph on moral testimony and moral knowledge that considers whether we can acquire moral knowledge by testimony, the role moral knowledge plays in attributing praise and blame, the relationship between moral understanding and moral knowledge, and the nature of moral advice.
Meeting ID: 942 5206 2740