

10th In-House Philosophy Graduate Conference

Friday (October 13th, 2017)

	Room N15 202	Room N15 203
10:00 - 10:10	10 th Conference Opening Ceremony by Howard Robinson (CEU)	
10.15 - 11:05	<i>The Hard Problem of Information: Making the Hard Problem Useful</i> Garrett Mindt (Chair: Philip Goff)	<i>Municipalities and the Ethics of Immigration</i> Zsolt Kapelner (Chair: Andres Moles)
11:05 - 11:55	<i>Panpsychism: A New Ontology with Old Properties</i> Marta Santuccio (Chair: Philip Goff)	<i>Self-ownership and human dignity</i> Zlata Bozac (Chair: Zoltan Miklosi)
	Coffee Break	
12.15 - 13.05	<i>Why Materialists Need Not Explain What It Is Like</i> Andy Mckilliam (Chair: Katalin Farkas)	<i>Consent and the Notion of Duties to Oneself</i> Yuliya Kanygina (Chair: Andres Moles)
	Lunch Break	
15:00 - 15:50	<i>The Nature of Representational Relation in the Higher-Order Thought Theory</i> Caglan Dilek (Chair: Howard Robinson)	<i>Mapping the Continuum of Research Strategies</i> Matthew Baxendale (Chair: Maria Kronfeldner)
16:00 - 16:50	<i>Heidegger and Ravaisson: Unreflective Abilities and Epistemic Foundationalism</i> James Cartlidge (Chair: Ferenc Huoranszki)	<i>A Feeling of Clarification: Neuro-docetism in a 'Thoroughly Naturalistic' Philosophy</i> Katsiaryna Suryna (Chair: Maria Kronfeldner)
	Coffee break	
17:15 - 18:45	Room: N15, Quantum Room Keynote Address by Tim Crane (CEU) <i>Two Conceptions of the Unconscious Mind</i>	
19:00	Welcome to New Students and Wine Reception	

Saturday (October 14th, 2017)

Room N15 202

Room N15 203

Coffee

10:00 – 10:50

Glasses, Mirrors, and the Perceptual Relation
Marius Jakstas (Chair: Hanoch Ben-Yami)

*The Relevance of Causal Explanations of Normative Beliefs:
An Argument for Normative Anti-realism*
Maarten van Doorn (Chair: Simon Rippon)

11:00 – 11:50

The Problems of the Argument from Illusion
Zhiwei Gu (Chair: Hanoch Ben-Yami)

Creation vs. Discovery: Allegorical Interpretation in Spinoza
Zsofia Gode (Chair: Mike Griffin)

Coffee break

12:10 – 13:00

Modal Logic Without Possible Worlds: A Tableau Approach
Peter Susánszky (Chair: Hanoch Ben-Yami)

*Russellian Monism and Fundamentality: Can the Universe
Be Fundamentally Both Phenomenal and Moral?*
Damjan Aleksiev (Chair: Howard Robinson)

Lunch Break

14:40 – 15:30

Structure of Intentionality: Experiencing Psychological Modes
Daria Vitasovic (Chair: Tim Crane)

Kant and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions
Jamie Elliott (Chair: Simon Rippon)

15:40 – 16.30

*Modus Tollens of Galen's Modus Ponens (in Defense of
Phenomenalism)*
Melvin Freitas (Chair: Tim Crane)

Manipulation Cases and Externalism
Gabor Tasnadi (Chair: Ferenc Huoranszki)

19:00

Dinner

Abstracts:

Keynote Address:

Tim Crane

Two Conceptions of the Unconscious Mind

Graduate Talks:

Damjan Aleksiev

Russellian Monism and Fundamentality: Can the Universe Be Fundamentally Both Phenomenal and Moral?

I aim to explore what composes the fundamental metaphysical level in the context of the Russellian monist metaphysical framework. I focus my attention on two sets of possibly fundamental facts: the phenomenal and the moral facts, and I investigate how they might relate to each other as well as to the physical facts. I wish to focus my attention on the phenomenal and the moral since we have separate strong philosophical arguments for thinking that both the moral and the phenomenal facts might be fundamental. In particular, I am interested in how robust realism about the moral and the phenomenal could work in the context of 'priority monism' as a metaphysical thesis according to which there is only one fundamental whole grounding everything else as parts. In order for such a combination at the fundamental level to be possible, the fundamental level must be intrinsically both phenomenal and normative.

Matthew Baxendale

Mapping the Continuum of Research Strategies

Contemporary philosophy of science has seen a growing trend towards a focus on scientific practice over the epistemic outputs that such practices produce. This practice-oriented approach has yielded a clearer understanding of how reductive research strategies play a central role in contemporary scientific inquiry. In parallel, a growing body of work has sought to explore the role of non-reductive, or systems-level, research strategies. As a result, the relationship between reductive and non-reductive scientific practices is becoming of increased importance. In this paper, I provide a framework within which research strategies can be

compared. I argue that no strategy is reductive or non-reductive *simpliciter*, rather strategies are more, or are less, reductive than one another according to a frame of reference. That frame of reference is provided by a continuum of possible ways in which the target system might be conceptualised. I illustrate the utility of the framework by deploying it to analyse a recent debate in cancer research. When set within the framework, a prominent reductive strategy – the Somatic Mutation Theory – and a prominent non-reductive strategy – the Tissue Organisational Field Theory – do not stand opposed to one another. Rather, they serve as boundary markers to chart the territory of approaches to carcinogenesis within which most strategies in the field fall.

Zlata Bozac

This paper aims to assess the claims against left-libertarianism put forward by Richard Arneson in his paper “Self-ownership and world-ownership: against left-libertarianism”. I will uphold certain claims of the paper, especially the one pertaining to combining self-ownership with inadequate (luck egalitarian) conceptions of equality, and the one referring to left-libertarian unwarranted invoking of Lockean tradition. However, against the claims of the paper, I will first argue that the fact that current mainstream left-libertarian views rely on incompatible conceptualizations of equality does not give a fatal blow to the approach. Second, I will argue that the concept of self-ownership, which lies at the heart of the theory, is not indeterminate and implausible as argued. Finally, I will show that the self-ownership thesis is grounded in particular important moral facts and intuitions.

James Cartlidge

Heidegger and Ravaisson: Unreflective Abilities and Epistemic Foundationalism

Much work in philosophy has been undertaken in the name of finding a secure ground or foundation for knowledge, a task often called Epistemic Foundationalism. Epistemic Foundationalism attempts to trace knowledge back to an ultimate source that underwrites and secures our knowledge-claims. Suggestions for what this source is have taken many forms, with some relying on transcendent sources outside and above our kind of comprehension, such as the Platonic Forms or God. Others have seen certain knowledge-claims in particular as being so indubitable and fundamental that they act as the guarantee for any coherent epistemic system - Leibniz’s work on the principles of sufficient reason and non-contradiction perhaps evidencing this. Foundationalist philosophy constitutes a vast literature with many perspectives on the same issues, but where I think many miss the mark is by failing to take note of unreflective abilities and their role in making human knowledge possible. Unreflective abilities are the set of pre-rational capacities we possess simply by virtue of being human. They are not abilities in the everyday sense of the word, but nonetheless amount to a knowing-how-and-being-able-to-do something. We did not choose to have or acquire them, they are not grounded in or by any reflective process (such as thought, reasoning, etc.) and they do not directly consist in the reflective processes themselves. Rather, they are with us long before we can participate in anything resembling a reflective process, since they are what enable and set up these processes. Many philosophers throughout history have taken note of or identified specific unreflective abilities, and my paper will take two examples of such philosophers and use their work as a basis on which to suggest

that it is these abilities that act as the foundations for human knowledge. Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* identifies multiple unreflective abilities, one of the most important being what he calls 'understanding', which is our pre-rational capacity for disclosing a world and apprehending the things in it as intelligible, meaningful. If this were not the case and we did not always already have an ability like this in place from the moment we are in the world, nothing like knowledge would not be possible for us. My second example is from the work of Felix Ravaisson who, in his text *Of Habit*, notices that we have an unreflective capacity for forming tendencies which, as he notes, is a fundamental necessity for our being in the world. There are surely many more unreflective abilities that have been noticed by philosophers (and more still to find), but it appears they play a fundamental role, perhaps multiple roles, in human existence. I will suggest that one fundamental role they play is the rendering possible of human knowledge. They thus act as a foundation for knowledge, but not the kind of foundation traditionally conceived of in epistemic foundationalism.

Caglan Dilek

The Nature of Representational Relation in the Higher-Order Thought Theory

David Rosenthal's classical Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory explains phenomenal consciousness of a mental state as the result a representational mechanism between two mental states. In this talk I will define the theory as follows: "A mental state is conscious only if it is represented by a higher-order thought in an appropriate manner". Among other points, this account is criticized on the notions of 'extrinsicness' and 'appropriate manner'. 1) How can an extrinsic relation explain an intrinsic quality like consciousness? Does 'extrinsicness' of the HOT to the first-order mental state imply 'contingency' instead of necessity? 2) How should we define the appropriate manner? Carruthers and Block takes it as a representation arrived at 'non-inferentially'. It should seem immediate and direct.

Modified Higher-Order Theories, Self-Representational Approaches and Phenomenological Approaches all attack HOT Theory on these grounds. There is a common understanding that there should be something intrinsic to phenomenal consciousness and some necessity for its emergence, that comes either from the relation between the representing mental states (modified HOT Theories and Self-Representational Theories) or from the experience from the start (Phenomenological Approaches). I will focus on the criticisms on HOT Theory based on these two notions and try to defend the classical HOT theory.

Maarten Van Doorn

The Relevance of Causal Explanations of Normative Beliefs: An Argument for Normative Anti-realism

We think of ourselves of beings whose normative judgments (most of them anyway) are true. Insofar as we regard our normative judgments as true, we must agree that there is a striking coincidence between (1) the normative judgments that are true, and (2) the normative judgments that causal forces led us to believe. This coincidence between the normative truth and what causes led us to believe is puzzling and demands some kind of explanation. Normative realism holds that there are normative truths that hold independently of all our evaluative attitudes. Understood as positions internal to the normative domain, I argue that normative realism fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the outlined puzzle and that normative antirealism does better.

Jamie Elliott

Kant and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions

In *Modern Moral Philosophy* Elizabeth Anscombe noted that '[Kant's] rigorous convictions on the subject of lying were so intense that it never occurred to him that a lie could be relevantly described as anything but just a lie (e.g. as 'a lie in such and such circumstances)' (1958, p.2). Taking a hint from this observation, I believe we can observe the following: that Kant's understanding of what having a good will consists in - the laws which govern such a will and how they are identified - commits Kantians to recognising certain virtuous actions as bad and certain vicious actions as good. Given that a virtuous action is a good action and a vicious action a bad action, Kantians are committed to an absurd contradiction, one which makes the Kantian account of ethics untenable. Arguing for this commitment, and subsequently identifying why it arises for Kant's work are the two tasks I undertake in this paper.

Melvin Freitas

Modus Tollens of Galen's Modus Ponens (in Defense of Phenomenalism)

Galen Strawson (1987; 2014) argues that realists about a mind-independent external world *cannot* be regularity theorists about causation on pain of incoherence, and he sees this as a stunning indictment against the regularity theory of causation (viz., the view that causation is constituted by nothing more than the bare regularities of events.) This is in contrast with what he calls the 'common sense' or 'producing causation' view (viz., the view that real causation implies the actual production, or bringing about, of events in addition to their regularity.) Strawson thus argues, by *modus ponens*, that: if realism is true, then the regularity theory of causation is false, but, *assuming* realism is true, then the regularity theory of causation is false. Realism is assumed since most regularity theorists are in fact realists about a mind-independent external world. Strawson acknowledges that this argument does not address any phenomenologists who happen to be regularity theorists. He suggests that the regularity theory of causation actually goes hand-in-hand with phenomenalism. I accept the validity of Strawson's arguments. However, as is oft said, 'one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.' The regularity theory of causation can be assumed just as well as realism, since, conversely, there are many realists who are regularity theorists about causation. Therefore, I argue, by *modus tollens*, that: if realism

is true, then the regularity theory of causation is false, but, *assuming* the regularity theory of causation is true, then realism is false (thus lending significant support to phenomenalism.)

Zsafia Gode

Creation vs. Discovery: Allegorical Interpretation in Spinoza

The allegorical rendering of certain biblical narratives and religious expressions in Spinoza's work continues to sow considerable confusion among his interpreters. In the *Theological-Political Treatise (TTP)*, Spinoza offers a critical-historical interpretive method that appears incompatible with allegorical readings, the proponents of which he even criticizes in explicit terms. And yet allegorical interpretations are far from absent in his mature works, including the *TTP* and other post-*TTP* writings.

Carlos Fraenkel has proposed a solution to this problem by highlighting Spinoza's closer-than-admitted ties to the tradition of allegorical reading, and has painted a picture of the philosopher as a thinker ultimately conflicted about matters of biblical hermeneutics. On this reading, Spinoza's merging of the allegorical and the critical represents two separate, irreconcilable projects rather than a coherent enterprise. But what exactly puts allegorical readings in opposition to a critical methodology? And can we, as it were, have various interpretations of allegorical interpretation itself? The answers to these questions will have crucial ramifications for the question of coherence, but they nonetheless remain relatively underinvestigated in Spinoza scholarship. By proposing a two-fold model of allegorical interpretation, one on the basis of creation and one on the basis of discovery, I hope to provide an alternative to Fraenkel's picture.

Zhiwei Gu

The Problems of the Argument from Illusion

In my talk, I shall argue that the argument from illusion is invalid. In order to make the argument valid, one approach is to add the Uniqueness Assumption. However, as I shall argue that this assumption cannot be defended. I shall show that if we are perceptually aware of sense-data in illusion, we are also possibly aware of external objects; the content of perception can be a combination of a sense-datum and an external object if sense-data are admitted. I shall also demonstrate that sense-data theorists' favorite reading (phenomenal reading of "appear to") of the Phenomenal Principle will make the whole argument either trivial or inscrutable.

Marius Jakstas

Glasses, Mirrors, and the Perceptual Relation

In my talk, I will take issue with Tim Crane's argument that the case of taking one's glasses off reveals us something significant about the metaphysics of perceptual experience (presented in his 2006 paper 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?'). I will propose an analysis of mirror reflections that shows why the argument is not compelling.

Yuliya Kanygina

Consent and the Notion of Duties to Oneself

In this talk I consider an immediate objection to the idea of duties to oneself, namely, that the very notion of a duty owed to oneself is internally incoherent. It is in the nature of a duty that no one can release oneself from it. Yet, if an agent had a duty to herself, she would be able to release herself from it at any moment at will. That is, since we have discretion to release others from the duties they owe us, the same must be true about the purported duties to oneself. I argue that this argument rests on a mistake. To the extent that we can release others from their duties towards us, the explanation of why that is so lends no support to the claim that we can release ourselves from duties towards ourselves at any moment at will. I contend that what enables us to release someone from a duty they owe us is the normative power of consent. Hence, the claim that if an agent had a duty to herself, she would be in the position to release herself from it at any moment at will rests on the possibility of consenting intra-personally. I consider the idea of intra-personal consent and how well, if at all, it can be accommodated within the context of two fundamental questions in the focus of theorizing about consent: the nature of consent and the normative power of consent. I show that it does not stand the scrutiny, hence, the claim that if an agent had a duty to herself she would be in the position to release herself from such a duty at her discretion is unsupported.

Zsolt Kapelner

Municipalities and the Ethics of Immigration

Most political philosophers agree that states have a (pro-tanto) right to control immigration, i.e. to decide who can enter their territory, and to prosecute unauthorized immigrants. Yet numerous cities and countries in the world disregard this right of the state by hosting unauthorized immigrants and protecting them from prosecution. Can the practice of these *sanctuary cities and counties* be justified, and if so, can it be reconciled with the view that states have a right to control immigration, or to the contrary,

we should deny that states have this right? I argue that most arguments that support the state's claim to control immigration apply to municipalities as well. This, in my view, implies that *both* states and municipalities have the right to control immigration. This naturally raises the question: how to proceed if there is a conflict, as in the case of providing asylum for non-authorized immigrants? I defend the view that unless special circumstances obtain, the municipality's right should take precedence.

Andy Mckilliam

Why Materialists Need Not Explain What It Is Like

Here are two questions we can ask about a potentially conscious system:

- 1) Does it have experiences?
- 2) If it does have experiences, what are they like?

These two questions mark a distinction between two problems associated with consciousness. Conclusively answering the first of these questions requires uncovering the underlying basis (material or otherwise) of experience in general. It requires uncovering sufficient conditions for the existence of experience, and then determining whether those conditions are satisfied by the system in question. Conclusively answering the second requires not just uncovering the basis of experience in general, but also accounting for why particular experiences have the particular qualitative character that they do.

While this distinction (or a close analogue) is not uncommon in both the scientific and philosophical literature on consciousness, its implications for metaphysical arguments against materialism have been overlooked. The challenge of answering these two questions is typically conflated into a single hard problem for materialism. In this paper, I take some first steps towards exploring the relationship between experience in general and qualitative character and argue that seeing them as related via the determinable/determinate relation can go some way towards defending materialism against a class of anti-materialist arguments. I provide an argument that shows that being able to conclusively answer the first of these questions is sufficient to vindicate materialism. In other words, even if the materialist cannot tell us what a particular conscious system's experiences are like from the subjective perspective, if she can explain how a purely material system can constitute a subject of experience, then all forms of anti-materialism about consciousness can be rejected. Of course, providing such an explanation remains a seriously hard problem, but by not lumping these two tasks together we don't make the problem of consciousness harder than it actually is.

Garrett Mindt

The Hard Problem of Information: Making the Hard Problem Useful

The Hard Problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995) is the problem of why there is any experience associated with the physical processes occurring in our brains. Recently I have argued (Mindt, 2017) that information-theoretic accounts of consciousness, such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT), face a slightly different hard problem, what I call the hard problem of information. The Hard Problem of Information is “why is it the case that there is any experience associated with the informational processes occurring in our brains?” (Mindt, 2017). In this talk I will be discussing why we should start thinking of the hard problem of consciousness as the hard problem of information. This will involve discussing why we need to think about the usefulness of the hard problem for the philosophical and scientific investigation of consciousness. My contention is that we need to start paving a middle ground between those who take the hard problem as an unsurmountable metaphysical challenge and those on the other side that are forced to ignore the hard problem to continue to investigate consciousness scientifically. My hope is that by paving such a middle ground, we’ll be left with a problem that respects the philosophical challenges of the hard problem while making a useful conceptual shift for those working in the science of consciousness.

Marta Santuccio

Panpsychism: A New Ontology with Old Properties

Panpsychism, in its contemporary formulation, is the view that some fundamental physical entities are conscious (Chalmers, 2013). These fundamental physical entities therefore have physical properties which account for the way these behave or relate to other particles, for example mass and charge, as well as having phenomenal properties which characterize what it is like to be that entity experientially. The panpsychist thus claim that phenomenal properties are fundamental, along with the set of fundamental properties that physics gives us an account of, and claims that macro-consciousness, i.e. the consciousness that humans and animals enjoy, is grounded in the consciousness of these fundamental entities.

Panpsychism has recently attracted considerable attention in the literature for its potential to overcome the problems that threaten rival theories, dualism and physicalism, and to provide us with an account of the nature of consciousness and its relation to matter. It has been argued, however, that the panpsychist ontology merely relocates, rather than overcome, the problems that threaten her rivals. Goff (2009, 2017) and Chalmers (2017) show that a conceivability argument, usually used to challenge the physicalist, can be redirected against the panpsychist. Similarly, a form of the causal exclusion argument against the dualist can be transposed to challenge the panpsychist (Howell, 2014).

Ramsey (1931) claims that when a philosophical dispute presents an irresolvable oscillation between the available alternatives, they likely share some common false presupposition. I argue that the dispute above is one such case. I reason that panpsychist must share an (implicit) assumption with her rivals. By relying on the combination problem, the most pernicious for the panpsychist, I identify the false assumption as the idea that consciousness should be articulated in terms of properties. More specifically I argue that, while consciousness at the macro-level manifests itself in the form of phenomenal experience and can thus be articulated in terms of phenomenal properties, this is not necessarily the case when giving an account of what consciousness is like at the fundamental level. The main point of my argument is that talking about fundamental consciousness in terms of phenomenal properties imposes a metaphysical distinction between the physical and experience, a distinction that parallels that drawn or implied by dualists and physicalists respectively. This metaphysical distinction is precisely the source of the problems that the panpsychist sets out to avoid and inevitably runs into. Engaging in phenomenal properties talk, therefore, limits the scope and potential of the panpsychist ontology.

I conclude by agreeing with A. N. Whitehead (1929) that the distinction between the physical and the experiential should be merely a conceptual one and suggest that a promising solution for the panpsychist would be to conceive of fundamental consciousness in terms of process, as opposed to phenomenal properties. This move may allow the panpsychist to save her ontology from threats analogous to the dualist and the physicalist by removing the problematic metaphysical distinction between physical and phenomenal properties.

Peter Susanszky

Modal Logic without Possible Worlds: A Tableau Approach

In an unpublished paper, Ben-Yami demonstrated that one can give a semantics of modal propositional logic without the use of a model using a truth-valuational approach. In my paper, I will adopt his approach with a few modifications, then I will use Fitting's modal tableau proof system to prove the soundness and completeness of the system relative to my truth-valuational semantics.

Katsiaryna Suryna

A Feeling of Clarification: Neuro-docetism in a 'Thoroughly Naturalistic' Philosophy

I focus on Thomas Metzinger's conception of mental autonomy and cognitive agency which, as he contends, can provide the criteria for an empirically grounded notion of personhood. Metzinger offers a conceptual toolkit based on what he sees as a more fine-grained and critical analysis of experience and follows a general pattern of the illusionist arguments to motivate a conceptual revision. I argue that no such analysis of experience will provide the evidence to the kind of revisionary claims he puts forward: i. that we are under the illusion of being autonomous thinking agents; ii. that, in certain cases, the psychological predicates we

ascribe only to the person can and should be ascribed to the brain. Such revisionary claims are based on a series of misconceptions and problematic assumptions, one of them being the view on personhood as an introspective access to the content properties of mental states.

Gabor Tasnadi

Manipulation Cases and Externalism

Manipulation cases are often used to show that the compatibilist control conditions for moral responsibility are insufficient. These cases involve an agent who, despite satisfying the compatibilist conditions, is not morally responsible as a result of external manipulation. Furthermore, incompatibilists claim that there is no relevant difference between a manipulated and a simply deterministic causal history.

There are two main directions compatibilists can take to reply: hard compatibilists accept that manipulated agents can be free and responsible, while soft compatibilists make an attempt to show that there is a crucial difference between manipulated and simply deterministic causal histories. The most straightforward way in which soft compatibilists could show the difference between manipulation and determinism is to introduce an historical condition for moral responsibility, a condition that is not satisfied by manipulated agents. The resulting view is historical compatibilism, which is sometimes identified with externalist compatibilism.

In my presentation, I show that (1) historical compatibilism faces serious difficulties and cannot answer the manipulation challenge, but (2) historical compatibilism should not be identified with externalist compatibilism, so (3) soft compatibilists can still look for other ways to refute the manipulation argument.

Daria Vitasovic

Structure of Intentionality: Experiencing Psychological Modes

We catalogue the structure of intentionality with the help of a fundamental distinction between psychological modes, on the one hand, and contents, on the other. While intentional contents pertain to *what* is represented, modes or attitudes are meant to capture *how* the content is represented, or, more precisely, the nature of the subject's directedness toward a particular content. If one accepts this informative nature of modes and is not an eliminativist or a reductionist about their character, but rather a primitivist,

then modes supply the mental state with a proprietary intentional inject independent of content. Since both of these variables need to be fixed in order to fix the nature of conscious mental states, an intuitive question would be how do we experience psychological modes? Is phenomenology distinctive at the level of modes, and not just that of contents? If we accept that modes contribute to phenomenology of a mental state, then when I judge that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris or see a lemon blurrily, is my degree of confidence in the judgment or the blurriness of my visual experience matter of mode or content? In this talk I put forward a new metaphysical model of individuating phenomenology of modes, the modifiers model, based on non-representational features of mental states that make a difference how the occurrent mental state is given to us in experience. I also contrast my model with most intuitive counter-models, namely; the content model according to which the modifier is part of the content (e.g. I judge *that Paris is capital of France moderately high.*); and the degree model according to which the modifier is part of the mode, hence modes come in degree (e.g. *I judge moderately high that Paris is capital of France.*)