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<tr>
<td>10.00</td>
<td><strong>11th Conference Opening Ceremony by Tim Crane</strong></td>
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<td>10.15</td>
<td><strong>Overdetermination and Interactionism: An Argument for Mind-Body Dualism</strong>&lt;br&gt;Aaron Lambert&lt;br&gt;(Chair: Tim Crane)</td>
<td><strong>Rethinking Marriage</strong>&lt;br&gt;Marko Konjovic&lt;br&gt;(Chair: Andres Moles)</td>
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<td><strong>Opposing the Mind to the Body</strong>&lt;br&gt;Ruben Noorloos (Chair: Tim Crane)</td>
<td><strong>‘The Kids Aren't Alright.’ But How Should We Take Care of Them?</strong>&lt;br&gt;Zlata Božac (Chair: Andres Moles)</td>
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<td><strong>The Role of Scientific Instruments in Coordinating Scientific Concepts and Measurement Procedures: The Case of the Origins of Ohm’s Conceptual Apparatus</strong>&lt;br&gt;Michele Luchetti (Chair: Maria Kronfeldner)</td>
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| 15.15 – 16.15| Are Representationalist Theories of Perception Compatible with Direct Realism?  
Rob Hoveman (Chair: Istvan Bodnar) |
| 16.30 – 18.00| **Room: N15 101 Quantum Room**  
Keynote Address by Simon Rippon (CEU)  
*What is Healthy Functioning? Reflections on Synthetic Biology*  
(Chair: Tim Crane) |
<p>| 18.00        | <strong>Wine Reception (Quantum Foyer)</strong>                                       |</p>
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<td><strong>Neutral Monism</strong>&lt;br&gt;Marta Santuccio (Chair: Katalin Farkas)</td>
<td><strong>Practical Knowledge, Intention in Acting, and Deviant Formal Causation</strong>&lt;br&gt;Huaming Xu (Chair: Ferenc Huoranszki)</td>
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<td>11.00 - 11.15</td>
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<td>11.15 - 12.15</td>
<td><strong>How Do Conceivability Arguments Work? Epistemic and Metaphysical Requirements</strong>&lt;br&gt;Damjan Aleksiev (Chair: Katalin Farkas)</td>
<td><strong>Kaplan on Referring</strong>&lt;br&gt;Jamie Elliott (Chair: Ferenc Huoranszki)</td>
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<td>14.00 - 15.00</td>
<td><strong>Why I Don’t Believe in an (Infinite) Multiverse</strong>&lt;br&gt;Kamyar Asasi (Chair: Howard Robinson)</td>
<td><strong>How To Solve Frege’s Puzzle? Does the Solution Matter?</strong>&lt;br&gt;Nikhil Mahant (Chair: Simon Rippon)</td>
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<td><strong>Normative Non-Naturalism and Explanatory Challenges</strong>&lt;br&gt;Maarten Van Doorn (Chair: Mike Griffin)</td>
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<td>19.00</td>
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Keynote Address

Simon Rippon
What is Healthy Functioning? Reflections on Synthetic Biology

Graduate Talks

Damjan Aleksiev
How do conceivability arguments work? Epistemic and metaphysical requirements

In this talk, I will explore the general structure of conceivability arguments, as well as the metaphysical and epistemic requirements that are need for such arguments to work. In the broadest sense, conceivability arguments aim to reach a metaphysical conclusion about the actual world based on what we can conceive a priori, i.e. from the proverbial philosopher's armchair. As such, conceivability arguments are quite controversial. I argue that conceivability arguments can work if we accept specific metaphysical assumptions about the world, as well as specific epistemic assumptions about our relation to the world. The metaphysical assumptions I accept are that the world is constructed in such a way where there is a fundamental and derivative level of reality, that the fundamental entities have essences, and that these essences determine their modal relations. The epistemological assumptions I accept are that we can know the essences of entities in the world, that we can form transparent concepts of them, and that the knowledge of such essences translates into knowledge of their modal and metaphysical relations.

Kamyar Asasi
Why I Don’t Believe in an (Infinite) Multiverse

The multiverse refers to the idea that there are a large number of universes along with our universe. Some proponents of the theory take this number to be infinitely large claiming that we live in an infinitely big multiverse. One of the main motivations for proposing multiverse theory has been the seemingly “fine-tuned” physical laws and constants for life. According to this line of reasoning—usually called anthropic reasoning—regardless of the fact that a life-permitting universe is very improbable, in a sufficiently vast and varied multiverse, life unavoidably appears somewhere; therefore, there is no surprise that we find ourselves in the only place we could live, namely one of the relatively few life-friendly places. I will try to show that firstly, the universe may not be as fine-tuned as is usually taken to be; secondly, even if it is fine-tuned for life it itself gives little support for the
existence of infinite universes; thirdly, the idea of infinite universes has a great cost in terms of parsimony, leads to a lot of nonsense, and for many is unscientific; fourthly, despite all of its costs, the multiverse theory does not solve the problem of fine-tuning and at best pushes it into a deeper level; finally, I will defend a view that puts the question of fine-tuning along with many other questions which their “answers” are either inaccessible to us or require a radically different approach and argue why we should prefer this view over the idea of an eternal and infinity large multiverse.

Zlata Božac
‘The Kids Aren’t Alright’. But How Should We Take Care of Them?

Children have not been the subject of any extended philosophical discussion until recent years. In the past, philosophers often discussed the issue of children in a superficial and disorganized manner, failing to offer a systematic position on the moral status and rights of children, as well the duties of others, parents and non-parents alike, towards them. This talk focuses on views on children produced by the proponents of a particular tradition in political philosophy – libertarianism. Traditionally, libertarian thought focused on the so-called proprietarian view on children, which emphasizes significant ownership rights of parents over their children, thus neglecting to discuss the status of children in the virtue of them being proto-adults and therefore, prospective moral agents. Recent proponents of libertarianism, such as Hillel Steiner, followed that line of reasoning, qualifying it, however, in the light of egalitarian considerations that left-libertarianism is concerned with. These qualifications discussed the duties of parents, not only towards their offspring, but towards their fellow citizens. Some, like Peter Vallentyne, examined general duties towards children. This paper critically examines such proposals and offers a new one, which, presumably, deals better with the difficulties of the previous ones, while staying faithful to libertarian spirit.

James Cartlidge
The Possibility and Necessity of Philosophical Anthropology

In this talk, my aim is to defend the discipline of philosophical anthropology as possible and worthwhile. To do this, I begin with a brief sketch of what anthropology is and its various sub-disciplines, which will lead on to a sketch of philosophical anthropology. I then consider a kind of argument that has been used to argue for the impossibility of another discipline: the substantive philosophy of history. This kind of argument makes use of the 'empirical/a priori' distinction to argue that because substantive philosophy of history mixes the two realms, it is impossible. If such an argument is legitimate, philosophical anthropology is impossible too. I will show why we have no reason to endorse such an argument. Having done this, I will examine arguments drawn from postmodernism, specifically in the work of Foucault and Derrida, that if true also imply the impossibility of philosophical anthropology. Having defended philosophical anthropology from these arguments, I finish by discussing the necessity and potential benefits of conducting philosophical anthropology.
Jamie Elliott
*Kaplan on Referring*

In this talk I illustrate David Kaplan’s account of direct reference and provide some thoughts on its persuasiveness.

Zhiwei Gu
*A Parallel Argument of the Argument from Hallucination*

The argument from hallucination plays a central role in the contemporary debate on the philosophy of perception. It concludes that a perceiver does not (directly) perceive the ordinary things (e.g. a chair, a green patch, a traffic accident) which she is supposed to perceive. The proponents think that the argument effectively disproves naïve realism, since naïve realists widely hold a. that perception consists in a non-intentional or non-representational relation between the perceiver and the ordinary things, and b. that the perceptual experience (if there is any) is constituted by the perceived things, the subject’s sense faculties and the subject’s particular spatiotemporal relation to the perceived things. In my talk, I shall construct a parallel argument of the argument from hallucination to show why without appealing to a full causal account of perception and hallucination the original argument fails to challenge naïve realism. In particular, it fails to motivate the same account for perception in accordance with hallucination. On the other hand, appealing to a full causal account reveals the essential difference between perception and hallucination, which undermines the original motivation for providing the same account for perception in accordance with hallucination.

Rob Hoveman
*Are Representationalist Theories of Perception Compatible with Direct Realism?*

Representationalist or intentionalist theories of perception are currently dominant in the philosophy of perception. They are often presented as compatible with direct realism whilst at the same time accommodating the intuition that there is something in common between veridical experience and perceptual experiences which are illusions or hallucinations. They are modelled on a certain conception of thoughts but with a specific sensory element, to reflect the fact perceptual experience is typically taken to involve experience of sensible qualities. This sensory element distinguishes perceptual experiences from thoughts. However, I argue that that sensory element is problematic for representationalist theories. Where the sensory element is regarded as a feature of the experience alone, the representationalist theory becomes little different from sense datum theories which are typically taken to be at best indirectly realist. But if the sensory element is taken to reflect the sensible properties of objects directly present in the perceptual experience, it is difficult to see how the theory differs from non-representationalist, “relationalist” theories. I examine possible ways out of this dilemma but conclude that there are no such satisfactory ways to escape it.
Marko Konjovic
Rethinking Marriage

Is the existence of marriage just or unjust? This is the main question within the recent debate over marriage in liberal political philosophy. Both advocates and opponents of marriage agree that traditional (dyadic, different-sex) marriage is unjust. But, is marriage (or marriage-like statuses) salvageable as an institution or is it hopelessly anachronic? Some argue that the liberal state has good reasons to retain the institution of marriage in some altered form (Calhoun 2005; Torcello 2008 on some interpretations; March 2010, 2011 on some interpretations; Metz 2010 on some interpretations; Brake 2012; Shrage 2013; Den Otter 2015). I call this the Reformist position. Others advocate the abolition of state-recognized and state-administered marriage (Weitzman 1981; Shultz 1982; Fineman 1995, 2005; Butler 2000; Card 2007; Torcello 2008 on some interpretations; Metz 2010 on some interpretations; Chambers 2017). I call this the Abolitionist position. Insofar as both Reformists and Abolitionists invoke liberal principles of liberty, equality, and state neutrality, however, the current debate about marriage is deeply puzzling, for how can marriage (or marriage-like status) be good and bad at the same time? What exactly should liberal egalitarians say about marriage?

In this paper I begin to answer this puzzle by examining the arguments against state-recognized marriage. I divide the arguments into three groups: (i) the argument from oppression, (ii) the argument from assimilation, and (iii) the argument from stigmatization. The arguments from oppression, assimilation, and stigmatization criticize the institution of marriage from three different fronts: the feminist, the queer, and the liberal perspectives. This division of the arguments against state-recognized marriage is certainly not rigid, for aspects of the feminist, queer, and liberal arguments against marriage sometimes run together. Nevertheless, such a fragmentation is useful analytically: it is meant to highlight the different ways in which marriage might affect individuals’ material or legal status and the ways in which marriage might instantiate or strengthen prevalent social norms or ideological values. Although I agree that these three arguments raise legitimate worries for political liberals, I argue that the conclusion that state-recognized marriage should be abolished is premature. It is important to note that the arguments I put forth are not positive arguments for marriage (or marriage-like status), for this is a different task; they are, rather, negative arguments against the alternative.

Aaron Lambert
Overdetermination and Interactionism: An Argument for Mind-Body Dualism

One of the biggest stumbling blocks for mind-body dualism is the conjunction of mental-physical causal interaction and the principle of physical causal closure. Both principles are plausible; interactionism because of our direct experience of ourselves as causal agents, and physical closure because it manifests itself as a constituent principle of scientific practice. It drives research paradigms and, whether or not physical determinism is true, no scientific results have presented any evidence of its falsity. The combined plausibility of interactionism and closure has resulted in variations of an apparently powerful argument for physicalism, sometimes presented in the form of a
reductio ad absurdum. The distinctness of mental and physical events, in combination with physical causal closure, that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, and interactionism, that some mental events cause some physical events, lead to an untenable outcome: physical events with mental causes are causally overdetermined by them. To avoid this, the distinctness of the mental and the physical is denied, and hence physicalism, the identity of mental events with some physical events, is upheld.

In the first part of this talk I deny that overdetermination must be the result of the distinctness of the mental and the physical, when combined with closure and interactionism. Overdetermination does result under one account of mental and physical event individuation. But arguably, this account fails to correctly characterise event individuation in the context of mental-physical causation. In particular, it ignores that mental events with physical effects cause physical types, not tokens. An alternative account is provided, one which cleaves more closely to the way physical events are differently type-individuated in mental and physical explanations of their occurrence, and according to which the physical effects of mental causes are always only their partial effects. The physical properties of physical effects of mental events realise mental properties which are not realised in the counterfactual situation in which an event with identical physical properties only has a physical cause. The threat of overdetermination is thus dispelled; in a phrase, the mental and the physical do different things, even when the results of their respective doings are token identical.

In the second part of this talk I examine how Donald Davidson’s Anomalous Monism argument for physicalism also uses a version of the causal closure of the physical to drive a physicalist conclusion. But there is a curious tension in Davidson’s argument, often highlighted by its detractors: under one description mental events are anomalous, escaping the net of strict laws, while under another other they are not, for being causes of physical effects, they must fall under the purview of strict laws. One way of resolving this tension is to remove the less tenable requirement, that mental-physical causation is nomological, and assert instead a strengthened version of anomalousness, that mental events do not have descriptions that satisfy strict laws. What results is an argument for dualism, showing that, far from being the enemy of interactionist dualism, the casual closure of the physical domain can function as a premise in a valid argument for it.

Michele Luchetti


In this talk, I defend the claim that scientific instruments can have a crucial role in the process of coordination between scientific concepts and concrete phenomena. This means that they determine some basic conditions for the identification of certain epistemic components (e.g. measurement outcomes), where these conditions are not supplied by theoretical commitments. Such a claim opposes both forms of radical theory-ladenness of instrumentation and experimentation, but also the experimental realism which arose as a reaction to claims of theory-ladenness.
To illustrate my claim, I reconstruct the historical development of Ohm’s core electrical concepts: “resistance”, “exciting force”, and “tension”. Once the fundamentals of my historical analysis are in place, I focus on the role of Ohm’s experimental apparatus. Ohm deployed certain instruments as productive tools, since they generated a phenomenon according to laws yet to be made precise, and some others as quantifying tools, in that they were supposed to measure certain quantities. Although the coordination achieved by Ohm does not fall victim of circular theory-ladenness, epistemological issues may be raised concerning the reliability of his apparatus. Still, I focus instead on how the combination of productive and quantifying instruments was crucial in determining the identity conditions for certain features of the conceptual apparatus developed by Ohm. Generalising from my example, I characterise this constitutive role of scientific instruments as a trade-off between the extent to which an experimental set-up is justified by theoretical background, and the extent to which material features of instrumentation constrain the experimental manipulation and, therefore, determine features of the outcome of the epistemic interaction.

**Nikhil Mahant**

*How to Solve Frege's Puzzle? Does the Solution Matter?*

In this paper, I will argue that that equality is a relation between objects (i.e. referents of names) and that equality cannot be a relation between names or signs of objects. Thus, my thesis has two parts: firstly, that equality is a relation between names, and secondly, that equality cannot be a relation between names. I shall present two arguments in support of my thesis. The first argument, originally given by Frege (Frege, 1892), supports both parts of the thesis. However, a critic might argue that while Frege’s argument supports the first part of the thesis, it does not support the second. I shall present the critic’s objection & demonstrate the vulnerability of Frege’s argument. My second argument provides a different set of reasons in support of the second part of the thesis, thereby circumventing the critic’s objections. Finally, I shall discuss whether solving the puzzle one way or the other has any ramifications on the conclusions that Frege intended to establish using his puzzle.

**Ruben Noorloos**

*Opposing the Mind to the Body*

Philosophers who attack ‘dualistic’ views of the mind-body relation often claim that such views ‘oppose’ the mind to the body. But what does that mean? In this talk I suggest an answer. The mind is opposed to the body when it is conceived in such a way that mental acts cannot intrinsically express themselves in material events. Assuming otherwise entails thinking that there are mental acts that are sui generis in such a way that they are not in principle open to such an expression, and which have no intrinsic connection to the body. I illustrate this view by reference to recent discussions over the merits of a neo-Anscombe action theory over its Davidsonian alternative, the so-called ‘causal theory of action’. Anscombean argue that their position can avoid the problem of ‘deviant causation’ that has plagued the causal theory of action. It does this by (i) making the structure of the rationalization of the action identical (hence, isomorphic) to the structure of the action itself,
and by (ii) creating a necessary link between the intention and its actualization. It is in virtue of this latter condition that the Anscombean theory claims to be able to avoid the deviant causation problems. Without wanting to endorse it generally, I believe that these two conditions can serve as criteria for overcoming mind-body opposition in the case of action.

Marta Santuccio

Neutral Monism

Motivated by the problems that dualism and traditional forms of monism face in producing a satisfactory account of consciousness, I set out to investigate a different view that may have the potential to fare better: neutral monism. Neutral monism, in a nutshell, is the view that the world is wholly made up of one kind of stuff and that this stuff is neutral. Moreover, proponents of the view specify that physical and mental properties, namely those properties that characterise our mental life and those that describe the world we live in respectively, are constructible out of this basic neutral base.

The purpose of my talk is to better understand the view and its implications. More specifically, I aim to pin down the notion of neutrality and to investigate how physical and mental properties are supposed to derive from the basic neutral base. I argue that although the various ways that neutral monism is fleshed out in the current debate require to be further developed, it appears that the view does have the potential to provide us with a more adequate framework for thinking about consciousness, on the grounds that it deflates and avoids the issues that its rival views are threatened with.

Maarten Van Doorn

Normative Non-Naturalism and Explanatory Challenges

According to the Explanation Objection against normative non-naturalism, the non-naturalist must take the supervenience of the ethical properties on the base properties to involve a brute necessary connection between discontinuous properties. The non-naturalist must, therefore, it seems, take these connections between normative facts and base facts as unexplained. Recently, some non-naturalists have tried to cope with this challenge by arguing for the existence of normatively necessary non-causal determination relations between base facts and normative facts. The existence of such normative laws would account for the supervenience of normative facts on natural facts. Moreover, explanations typically come to an end in brute determination relations. As such, a failure to explain normative necessities is not, contrary to a failure to explain supervenience facts, a strike against a theory that posits them. In this talk, I argue that they have limited explanatory power because (i) normative necessities do not allow the non-naturalist to explain the right kind of supervenience, (ii) they leave something morally important unexplained. Moreover, (iii) their metaphysical contingency makes it hard to provide evidence for their existence.
Huaming Xu

Practical Knowledge, Intention in Acting, and Deviant Formal Causation

In a recent paper, Sarah K. Paul (2010) puts forward a new argument in favor of the Causal Theory of Action (CTA): namely, the problem of deviant formal causation. The problem is concerned with the relation between what an agent takes herself to be doing and the description (or descriptions) under which what is happening counts as an intentional action of her. By contending that the “non-causal” neo-Anscombian theory of action is susceptible to this problem whereas some version of the CTA is well-prepared to deal with it, she concludes that the latter is a better theory of action (in this respect) than the former. My purpose in this paper is to defend a version of the neo-Anscombian theory of action. First, I will argue that the non-causal neo-Anscombian theory of action, properly understood, does not face the problem of deviant formal causation. Second, I shall maintain that there are remarks in G. E. M. Anscombe’s monograph Intention which can furnish the Anscombian with an efficient-causality understanding of intention in acting. And third, I will concentrate on § 11 and § 19 of Intention and try to show that they do not contain a conceptual source of ruling out such an efficient-causality account of intention in acting. I shall conclude the paper by motivating a Non-Propositionalist Cognitivist view of intention in acting.