ABSTRACT | Does good governance exist under autocracy and to what extent public goods provision depends on budget autonomy and political loyalty? Local heads in Russia are caught between citizens and governors that hold them accountable. We aim to explore the heterogeneity of local governance in Russian municipalities (municipal and urban districts) by constructing weighted index of public goods provision and estimating the effects of budget autonomy and vote delivery for the United Russia in 2016-17. Our findings suggest that coercive vote mobilization harm public goods provision in municipalities of relatively small size.
BIO | Margarita received her Ph.D. in Social and Political Science from European University Institute and graduated from Political Science MA program at European University at St. Petersburg. She worked as intern for Electoral Integrity Project (Sydney and Harvard Universities) and published her research in such journals as East European Studies, Demokratizatsiya, Post-Soviet Affairs. Her current position is a postdoctoral researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute, University of Helsinki & European University at St. Petersburg.