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ABSTRACT
I argue that rationality can, after all, be used to mark a moral line
human beings and at least the non-human animals that we breed to eat.
I develop an account of the role of rationality in generating
distinctive rights that does not have application to non-human
animals, even though we do have obligations to them. I then consider
the empirical evidence concerning animal psychology that bears on our
moral relations to animals. In particular, I probe some central
empirical issues about the rational capacities of animals, beginning
with primates. I argue that it is at present unclear. However, I then
look at the empirical literature concerning the animals that we breed
to eat, and here I argue that it is far clearer that rational
capacities are lacking. On this basis I argue that a moral line
between human beings and non-human animals may be a good one despite
it being fuzzy and unclear in some places. That does not mean that
there are not many cases that fall clearly one side or the other,
which is what we need for action. I draw the consequences for
carnivorism.