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Bullshit as Fake Answers

Colloquium
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Tuesday, January 23, 2024, 3:40 pm – 5:20 pm

This colloquium talk is planned as an in-person event. Registration is only required for non-CEU members. 

ABSTRACT

In this talk, I will provide a theory of ‘fake answers’ that has the resources to unite different types of what philosophers, following Harry Frankfurt’s (1986) landmark essay, commonly label as “bullshitting”. I will show that the Frankfurtian indifferent bullshitter, often characterized by a lack of knowledge and concern, and the non-indifferent yet evasive bullshit artist, who deliberately withholds information, share a similarity that has been overlooked thus far. I will argue that both types of bullshitters contribute fake answers to questions under discussion with the aim of concealing their individual perspective—be it their indifference, ignorance, or even knowledge. Unlike true and false answers, fake answers are not answers in the narrow sense because they do not address the relevant question but are only meant to look as if they did. Contra indifference accounts of bullshitting, I argue that the essence of bullshit contributions is that they are intentionally off topic.

 

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