This colloquium talk is planned as an in-person event. Registration is only required for non-CEU members.
ABSTRACT
Substance dualism is the view that, in addition to our physical bodies, humans have immaterial minds or souls, which are substances in their own right. The received opinion in contemporary thought is that substance dualism is a very bad idea. Not only philosophers, but also specialists in other disciplines, popular writers, and the wider public, frequently behave as though substance dualism has been decisively refuted. But is this negative view of substance dualism is justified? This talk argues that it is not. On the contrary, I argue that the views of many contemporary theorists actually entail substance dualism, and that the reasons usually given for rejecting substance dualism are very weak. Substance dualism ought to be treated much more seriously than it has been in recent thought.
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